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An optimizing model of a small open emerging market economy (SOEME) with 
dualistic labour markets and two types of consumers, is used to derive the natural 
interest rate, terms of trade and potential output. Shocks are classified into generic 
types that affect the natural interest rates. Since parameters depend on features of the 
labour market and on consumption inequality, the natural rates and the impact of 
shocks differ from those in a mature small open economy. Subsistence consumption is 
found to have the largest effect on the natural rates. It reduces the interest rate, raises 
natural output and the terms of trade. Technology and infrastructure backwardness 
reduce natural output. The implications for monetary policy are derived. The effect of 
managed exchange rates combined with different types of inflation targeting is 
examined through simulations. Endogenous terms of trade make the supply curve 
steeper in a SOEME, so partial stickiness of the real exchange rate can be beneficial. 
In general, domestic inflation targeting, with some weight on the output gap, delivers 
lower volatility. Output response is higher and volatility lower with fixed terms of 
trade, demonstrating the flatter supply curve. CPI inflation targeting also does well 
when terms of trade are credibly fixed. 
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Forward-looking aggregate demand and supply curves are used to examine options 
for monetary policy. They are derived from an open economy dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) model with imperfect competition
2 and nominal 
rigidities
3 as well as labour market features that reflect a populous emerging market. 
Since the behavioral equation coefficients are derived from basic technology, 
preferences and market structure, they are robust to policy changes, thus meeting the 
Lucas critique.  The calibrated model allows estimation of indicative values for 
natural rates and the order of magnitude by which they differ from a small open 
economy (SOE).  
 
In DSGE models optimizing labour supply decision drive unemployment—this 
cannot capture the dimensions of developing economy unemployment. The modeling 
of two types of labour makes it possible to capture a major aspect. The small open 
emerging market (SOEME) has a large share of less productive labour in the process 
of being absorbed into the modern sector.  
 
The basic intertemporal optimization model tells us that the steady-state real interest 
rate must equal the representative consumer’s time discount rate plus the rate of 
growth of population. The problem is that for a sustained period of transition and 
rapid catch-up the growth rate of such an economy can be above the growth rate of 
population. Does that mean that the natural interest rate should equal this growth rate 
and be considerably higher than benchmark international interest rates
4? Since steady-
state values are not of much guidance in transition periods, modern microfoundation-
based models of monetary policy offer a good analytical framework in which to 
examine this question.  The framework is also more relevant for the design of actual 
monetary policy. 
 
The natural interest rate is defined as the equilibrium real rate, consistent with a zero 
or target rate of inflation, when prices are fully flexible. Shocks that change the 
natural rate open an output gap and affect inflation. Most Central Banks (CBs) have 
an operating target interest rate. This defines an operating rule, telling the CB how to 
change its interest rate in response to shocks. Inflation targeting is an example of such 
a rule.  
                                                 
2 Clarida et. al. (1999) surveys this literature, and Clarida et. al. (2001) extends it to an open economy. 
Woodford (2003) is a rigorous textbook treatment. 
3 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) is a textbook treatment of a large literature on the new open economy 
macroeconomics. Prices in their seminal contribution were determined one period in advance. Later 
treatments use variants of staggered prices, which allows smooth aggregate price adjustment.    
4 Such a view seems to guide Indian monetary policy making. For example a deputy governor of the 
Indian Reserve Bank, writes: “First, real GDP growth has recorded strong growth since 2003-04, 
averaging 8.6 per cent per annum over the four-year period ending 2006-07. This growth is 
significantly higher than world economic growth. This would suggest that equilibrium real interest 
rates for a country like India would be higher than world interest rates. Mohan (2007, pp.5)”   4
Shocks are of two generic kinds—those affecting demand and those affecting supply. 
They can be derived from the general equilibrium intertemporal optimization. The 
special labour market features of the SOEME introduce more shocks affecting the 
natural rate. Thus the SOEME model helps to identify these shocks, their difference 
from SOEs, and the implications for policy.  
 
Two types of consumers and labour are distinguished in the SOEME, those above 
subsistence (R), and those at subsistence (P). While the first are able to smooth 
consumption using international markets, those at subsistence cannot. Their 
intertemporal elasticity of consumption, productivity and wages are lower and their 
labor supply elasticity is higher, compared to the first group
5. These features follow 
from the key difference—high and low productivity. CES aggregation allows the 
micro diversity to be collapsed to macro aggregates, as is common in the literature.   
 
A key difference between the two kinds of economies is that the real exchange rate 
for the SOEME is depreciated and appreciates over the long-run as development 
brings it closer to purchasing power parity (PPP). But there are short-run fluctuations. 
The stronger effects of income on the terms of trade in a SOE imply that fluctuations 
in the terms of trade make the aggregate supply curve steeper. This is particularly so 
for an almost closed economy with a large percentage of P. Therefore it may be better 
to manage the terms of trade, in response to temporary shocks, thus flattening 
aggregate supply. Variations in the exchange rate can still be used to counter shocks 
to aggregate supply.       
 
A new exogenous variable in the model for the SOEME is consumption of the 
subsistence group. This has a large impact on the natural rate of interest, potential 
output, and the equilibrium terms of trade. In general, it reduces the effect of world 
output on these variables, compared to the SOE. A temporary shock to subsistence 
consumption imparts a strong negative shock to the natural rate, implying that policy 
should accommodate such a shock by decreasing the policy rate. The factors tending 
to decrease the natural rate are dominant. Subsistence consumption and the gap from 
world income levels, tend to raise natural output while technology and infrastructure 
backwardness reduce it. 
 
Policy also has to accommodate permanent changes in natural output and equilibrium 
terms of trade as transition occurs. There are multiple steady-states on the way. 
 
The welfare consequences of optimizing policy responses to shocks to the natural rate 
of interest are examined through simulations. Different types of inflation targeting are 
differentiated by weights in the policy objective function. Flexible targeting of 
domestic price inflation continues to deliver the best results, as in Goyal (2007). It 
involves active use of exchange rate policy to lower inflation, but volatility is lower 
than under consumer price targeting. The latter does almost as well as domestic 
inflation targeting when policy credibly fixes the terms of trade. The exchange rate is 
not itself a target but an instrument affecting both output and inflation. Constant terms 
of trade are consistent with variation in the nominal exchange rate.  
 
                                                 
5 This subsistence-based definition makes the model suitable for analyzing populous emerging markets 
such as India and China.   5
As more labour shifts above subsistence with development and the technology and 
infrastructure gap narrows, permanent changes occur in potential output, and in the 
equilibrium terms of trade. They eventually converge to world levels. By focusing on 
outcomes, inflation targeting allows policy to adjust to changes in potential output 
reflected in inflationary pressures. Changes in equilibrium terms of trade have also to 
be allowed. 
 
Since too many things are going on in the real world, a model can serve as a valuable 
laboratory. But to have confidence that it captures the crucial aspects of the economy, 
its response to simple shocks must be similar to that of the real economy—then it can 
be trusted for more complex shocks (Christiano at. al., 1999). The behavioral 
foundation, key structural aspects and the type of shocks modelled increase 
confidence that the paper does capture crucial aspects.  In the Indian economy, 
however, interest and exchange rate flexibility is relatively recent, there is no formal 
inflation targeting, and policy optimization is only implicit. The simulation results can 
be understood as indicating what policy should do in such a structure. The results are 
intuitive both with respect to theory and structure. Policy has long been targeting a 
real effective exchange rate or constant terms of trade, it has recently moved to a more 
flexible nominal exchange rate, interest changes have been smooth and mild, as the 
simulations recommend. But policy has sometimes failed to accommodate natural rate 
shocks and kept the level of the policy rate too high. There has, however, been a 
tendency to accommodate agricultural shocks—which are shocks to the consumption 
of the poor.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Determinants of the natural interest rate are 
discussed in Section 2.The basic model (outlined in Appendix A) is adapted to an 
emerging market in Section 3, and its differences from the SOE model noted. Natural 
rates are derived in Section 4. Calibrated values of the natural rates, long and short-
term optimal policy are obtained through simulations in Section 5. The results on 
optimal policy are assessed in the light of historical Indian macroeconomic policy in 
Section 6 before Section 7 concludes. Appendix B derives the employment subsidy 
that delivers the flexible price equilibrium in a SOEME.    
 
2. The Natural Rate 
The NKE school (Clarida et. al 1999, 2001, Woodford, 2003) has developed forward-
looking aggregate demand and supply curves from intertemporal optimization by 
representative consumers and firms
6. The rational expectations equilibrium from 
which aggregate demand is derived comes from the basic consumption Euler, Eq. (1), 
as a result of household choice of the optimum timing of expenditure. Aggregate real 
expenditure,  t Y , and the price index, Pt, must satisfy the Euler condition (1) at all 
periods, where rt is the riskless one period nominal interest rate controlled by the 
Central Bank (CB), Gt is government purchases, and UC is the household’s utility 
function. The exogenous disturbance, t ξ , captures variations in the household’s 
impatience to consume and β is its discount factor. 
 
                                                 
6 Investment is not explicitly modeled in this framework but its effect comes in through exogenous 
variations in productivity—the analysis abstracts from the affect of investment on productive capacity 
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Monetary policy responds through the interest rate. A natural way to think about 
monetary policy in this context is through the gap between the policy rate and the 
natural rate. The natural interest rate was a concept originally defined by Wicksell
7, as 
the equilibrium real rate of return when prices are fully flexible. It is derived from the 
basic consumption Euler equation when output,  t Y , equals its natural level,  t Y , and 
inflation is zero, so that prices are constant (or Pt= Pt+1). In these conditions the policy 
rate in Eq. (1) equals the natural rate in Eq. (2): 
n



































β       ( 2 )  
 
In the modern approach, the steady-state value of the natural interest rate is defined as 
the value consistent with a zero or target inflation rate. The natural rate is the real rate 
of interest that keeps aggregate demand equal to the natural rate of output. This 
equality follows from the firm’s optimization. Output is at its natural rate when the 
real marginal cost of supplying each good equals the marginal revenue for any firm 
that is thinking of changing its price, when all firms charge identical prices. But when 
this condition holds no firm wants to charge a different price, so there is no inflation. 
Marginal revenue is the reciprocal of the desired gross mark-up. Since at both  t Y and 
n
t r inflation is at zero,  t Y  is used to define 
n
t r . All these concepts are derived below in 
the context of our SOEME.  
 
The shock or exogenous term  t rr  that enters the NKE aggregate demand is then the 
percentage deviation of the natural rate from its steady-state value. The deviation 
occurs due to real disturbances that change natural output.  Log-linearizing Eq. 2, a 
real shock affecting utility gives  t rr , which equals the expectation term on the RHS 
of Eq.2: 
 
( ) log 1 log
n
tt rr r β ≡+ +    (3) 
 
In case of non-zero target inflation π , nominal interest rate must equal: 
 
tt rr r π = +       ( 4 )  
A non-zero target inflation can be abstracted from since although it affects average 
values of output and nominal interest rates, it does not affect the latter’s response to 
shocks upto a log-linear approximation. Since a log linearization of Eq. 1 implies that 
t t
n
t Y Y r − = +1 , to understand the CB’s response to shocks it is necessary to see how 
                                                 
7 The specific form of the interest rate rule Wicksell (1898) advocated for the implementation of price-
level targeting was for the CB’s interest rate to rise if prices rose, fall if they fell, and to remain 
unaltered at whatever level it was at, unless prices changed.  7
these shocks affect the natural output. A temporary shock to natural output changes 
the natural rate. 
 
By substituting Yt = t Y  in the firm’s marginal cost and log linearizing, an equation of 
the form  (5) below can be derived. Log linear approximations of equilibrium 
conditions are adequate since the policy focus is on small fluctuations around a steady 
state. The generic disturbances that affect natural output then are
8: 
 
( ) t t t t t h a c G f Y ϕ , , , ˆ =       ( 5 )  
 
Each of these disturbances increases natural output. They can be grouped into those 
affecting demand, and therefore requiring variation in log output to maintain a 
constant marginal utility of real income, and those affecting supply and therefore 
requiring variation in log output to maintain a constant marginal disutility of labour 
supply. Given these shocks, the change in natural output depends on the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution of private expenditure 1/σ, and the elasticity of real marginal 
cost with respect to a firm’s own output. In the first category are  t G ˆ  or the normalized 
deviation of government purchases from their steady-state level, and c or shift in 
consumer preferences. Technology, at, and labour supply shocks  t h ϕ , the latter due to 
shifts in the disutility of labour function, are in the second, or supply shock category. 
 
The effect of each of these shocks on  t rr  can be obtained by substituting these 
solutions into Equation (3) for  t rr : 
  
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) t h t a t c t G t h a c G g rr ρ ϕ ρ ρ ρ − − − − = 1 , 1 , 1 , ˆ 1    (6) 
 
Each disturbance follows an independent first-order autoregressive process. For 
stability the respective autocorrelation coefficients (subscripted ρ s) must each be less 
than unity.  The result is that  t rr  rises for any temporary demand shock and falls for 
any temporary supply shock. These equations and results are explicitly derived for our 
model in the section below. Variation in the generic shocks due to openness and 
underdevelopment is noted. 
 
In rational expectations equilibria with stable inflation, interest rates must follow 
these exogenous variations in the natural rate of interest. Optimal policy requires 
insulating the output gap from these shocks, so that the CB’s interest rate instrument 
should move in step with the natural rate. Thus the CB would accommodate supply 
shocks by lowering interest rates and offset demand shocks by raising interest rates. 
Since inflation may be stable even with a widening output gap if prices are preset, and 
output movements are the same under the different types of shocks but the optimal 
interest response varies, the CB may require information in addition to that contained 
in output and inflation to fully implement this policy. The required interest rate 
variation is higher the more temporary the shock.  
 
                                                 
8 See Woodford (2003) pp. 249 for a more specific functional form.  8
3. A Small Open Emerging Market Economy Model 
Key features of microfoundation based SOE models used to derive optimal monetary 
policy are intertemporal optimization and labour-leisure tradeoff by consumers; 
monopolistic competition and product diversity so that producers have pricing power, 
and output is below the social optimum. The Calvo model of staggered prices 
generates the sticky prices required for monetary policy to have real effects on output. 
The optimization results in simple standard aggregate demand (AD) and supply 
curves (AS) with the difference that they include forward-looking variables. The 




The basic model has to be adapted to make it relevant to analyze monetary policy in 
emerging markets with large populations in low productivity employment. The 
steady-state full employment assumption of equilibrium models is far from adequate 
in these markets.
10 We consider a small open emerging market economy (SOEME) 
with two representative households consuming and supplying labour: above 
subsistence (R) and at subsistence (P). The product market structure, technology and 
preferences of R type consumers are the same across all economies. Productivity 
shocks differ since emerging markets are in transition stages of applying the new 
technologies becoming available. P type consumers are assumed to be at a fixed 
subsistence wage, financed in part by transfers from R types.  
 
The government intermediates these transfers through taxes on R. It runs a balanced 
budget so that η TR, t + M t = - (1-η) TP, t where a negative tax is a transfer. M t is 
government revenue from its monetary operations. The subsidy is calculated to give P 
a subsistence wage if they work eight hours daily, but they are free to increase their 
wages by working longer hours. P types are willing to supply more labor hours to the 
modern sector at a wage epsilon above their opportunity cost or wages in the informal 
sector. Since each country is of measure zero, it takes world prices as given. 
 
The intertemporal elasticity of consumption (1/σR), productivity and wages (WR) of R 
are higher, their labour supply elasticity (1/ϕR) is lower compared to the P, and they 
are able to fully diversify risk in international capital markets. Ni, t denotes hours of 
labour supplied by each type.  
 
Consumption of each type of good is a weighted average of consumption by the R and 
the P households, with η as the share of R. Since R and P consume home (H) and 
foreign (F) goods in the same proportion, Ct is distributed between R and P in the 
same proportion η, where η is the share of above subsistence households in 
consumption. The aggregate intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/σ, and the 
inverse of the labour supply elasticity
11, ϕ, are also weighted sums with population 
shares of R and P as weights. Since P lack the ability to smooth consumption, their 
                                                 
9 Appendix A presents a simplified version of the Gali and Monacelli (2005, henceforth GM) small 
open economy model.  
10 This adaptation follows Goyal (2007). See the latter for detailed derivations, proofs, and systematic 
comparisons of the SOEME and the SOE.  
11 This is also the elasticity of price with respect to output in the aggregate supply curve derived. The 
labour supply elasticity of P can be expected to be high, and their intertemporal elasticity of 
consumption low. We normalize the latter at zero. Average ϕ is taken as 0.25 in the simulations, 
implying a labour supply elasticity of 4.    9
intertemporal elasticity of consumption approaches zero, so the averaging is done 
with elasticities, rather than inverse elasticities. 
 
The basic consumption Euler and household labor supply are derived for each type. 
Risk sharing can be derived only for R types. Payoffs D are taken as zero for P types, 
since they do not hold a portfolio of assets. 
  
To solve for St in terms of endogenous Yt and exogenous variables, first substitute CR, 
t and CP, t for Ct in the aggregate demand equal to supply equation and then substitute 
out CR, t using risk smoothing. This gives: 





S σ η η ) ( 1
,
* − =                                                                   (7)  
The terms of trade depreciate with a rise in Yt and appreciate with a rise in Yt*; but in 
a SOEME the former’s effect is magnified. CP, t also affects St, reducing the impact of 







D , which affects only the SOEME, is 
large because the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is small. If  σR =1, then ϖ =1, 
and if 1/σP = 0, then σ = σR/η. It also follows that σD <σ.  Both rise as η falls or the 
proportion of P with low intertemporal elasticity of consumption (1/σP = 0) rises. 
While η affects σ, both η and α affect σD. As α falls σD rises, and as α approaches 0, 
or the economy becomes closed, σD equals σ, which is its upper bound. In a fully 
open economy α approaches unity, and σD falls to its lower bound, the value unity in a 
SOE.  
 
The dynamic aggregate supply, which gives domestic inflation as a function of the 
output gap xt, now becomes: 
     { } t D t H t H x E κ π β π + = +1 ,              
(8) 
The slope for a SOEME is  ( ) ϕ σ λ κ + = D D . The corresponding value for a closed 





R , σR enters 
σα since R in the SOEME are identical to the representative SOE consumer. The slope 
is reduced in an open compared to a closed economy since σ > σD > σα, but the slope 
can be higher in the SOEME compared to a SOE, even though ϕ is lower for the 
SOEME, since σD > σα. While σα =1 if σR =1, σD always exceeds unity if α <1. 
Similar results hold for the more general case of σR ≠ 1. Since the gap between σ and 
σD is large and varies with η and α, the slope for the SOEME remains larger than in 
the SOE. 
 
The dynamic aggregate demand (AD) equation for the SOEME is derived from the 
consumption Euler (see Appendix A). Writing it in terms of the output gap gives a 
term in change in natural output, which defines the shock to the natural rate  t rr : 
       {} { } ( ) t t H t t
D




           
(9) 
Where  () ( ) ( ) } { } { 1 1
*
1 1 , + + Δ Ψ − Θ + Δ Φ + − − − Γ − = t t D t P t D t a D t y E c E a rr σ η σ ρ σ ρ   10














, ( )d D σ σ η − = Ψ ,  
      ( )( ) ( ) D d σ σ η − − = Φ 1      
           
Since σD > σα, the output gap is less responsive to the interest rate in the SOEME 
compared to the SOE.  
 
Thus (8) and (9) are the two AS and AD equations for the SOEME.  
 
4. The natural rates of output and the terms of trade 
The natural level of output  t y  is the level where marginal cost is at its desired steady-
state level -μ depending on the elasticity of demand. This has been derived for the 
SOE in the appendix and in our SOEME takes the value:  
   κ σ D t P t t t d c y a y + Φ − Ψ − Γ + Ω = ,
*                     
(10) 
Where 



















, ( )d D σ σ η − = Ψ , ( )( ) ( ) D d σ σ η − − = Φ 1       
(11) 
As in the case for marginal cost, the natural output for a SOE has σα instead of ση and 
no cP, t and ĸ term.  Since σ > σD > σα, but σR < σα when σR <1, y* always has a 
negative effect on potential output in the SOEME, but has a positive effect in the SOE 
when σR <1. The negative effect in the SOEME is reduced by the larger σD. The 
impact of technology on t y is also reduced. It can be negative if the SOEME 
technology parameter is below world levels normalized at unity. When CP, t is below 
C* normalized at unity, cP,t raises the value of  t y , since log CP, t is then negative. 
Potential is higher with higher ĸ to the extent that underdevelopment signifies an 
unrealized potential, although a differentν  neutralizes ĸ. As development occurs and 
the potential is realized ĸ goes to zero, and the coefficients of a SOEME approach that 
for a SOE.   
 
Setting y yt= in Eq. (7), which gives the variables influencing st, we can derive the 
natural rate of the terms of trade,  t s . Write Eq. (7) as: 
() κ η η
σ
− − − − = t P t t t
D




Substitute for  y yt=  from Eq. (10), to get:           
( ) ( ) ( ) () κ σ η η σ η d c y a s t P t t D t − − − + Σ − + Ψ − Γ + Ω = 1 1 ,
*  
The first three terms are similar to a SOE although the coefficients are different. y* 
always exerts a negative effect, appreciating t s ; so does κ (since 1 > dσD). The terms 
are all magnified since σD > σα, the latter being the value in the SOE. The calibrations 
imply that the positive cP, t term dominates. The result is intuitive since the cP, t term 
captures the lack of maturity of the SOEME; it implies that  t s is relatively depreciated 
compared to the value it will have when the cP, t terms disappear and the SOEME has 
become a SOE. In the latter case natural terms of trade must be appreciated compared 
to their value when the consumption gap is positive since of underdevelopment. The  11
cP, t term captures the distance from world consumption levels that has to be overcome 
in the steady state.  
         
5. Optimal policy 
The model is calibrated for a SOEME and the calibration is used to examine the levels 
of the natural rates, the types of shocks affecting the natural rates, their relative sizes, 
how these differ in the SOEME compared to the SOE, and how the former collapses 
to the latter after development is completed. The calibrated natural rates are 
conditional on the consumption of the poor, the distance from world incomes, other 
structural features, and world incomes. There are longer-term implications for policy 
as the SOEME catches up and the rates change.   
      
Short-term policy implications are also drawn for temporary shocks to the natural 
rate. The relative performance of different types of inflation targeting and of exchange 
rate intervention is examined through simulations. Because intervention has a 
rationale in the SOEME, leading to stickiness in the terms of trade, calibration and 
simulation was also done for this sticky S case. Uncovered interest parity (UIP) holds 
in some simulations but not when S or E is fixed. Limited capital account 
convertibility and some intervention that contribute to managing the exchange rates 
imply that UIP may not hold. The policy reaction function is estimated. 
 
The calibration is loosely based on Indian stylized facts. Empirical estimations and 
the dominance of administered pricing in SOEME’s suggest that past inflation affects 
current inflation (Fraga et. al., 2004), so a modification of the AS equation is made to 
accommodate such behaviour by imposing a share γb of lagged prices: 
{ } 1 ˆ 1 , 1 , , = + + ′ + = − + b f t H b t t H t f t H c m E γ γ π γ λ π β γ π  
In most simulations γb is set at 0.2 so γf is 0.8. Because of less than perfectly flexible 
interest rates, lagged interest rate also enters the AD with a weight of 0.2. The 
openness coefficient α is set at 0.3; the proportion of R,
12 η at 0.4; β= 0.99 implies a 
riskless annual steady-state return of 4 percent; the price response to output, ϕ, is set 
at 0.25, which implies an average labour supply elasticity of 4. Consumption of the 
mature economy and of the rich is normalized at unity, five times that of the poor so 
CP = 0.2. Given η, this gives consistent C values of 0.75, K of 1.1 so that cP =  -1.6 
and ĸ=0.1. Initial conditions are normalized at unity so the log value is zero.  
 
The natural output y t is derived from the flexible price equilibrium, with an 
employment subsidy  () τ ν − − = 1 log  set so as to correct for market power and for 
government temptation to change the terms of trade (GM, Section 4). In a SOEME it 
is also necessary to correct for the deviation from world income levels and poor 
infrastructure. The Appendix derives this value of the subsidy as 
() δ κ α μ ν log 1 log + − − + = . The index of infrastructure δ is taken as 0.5 less than 
the world level of unity
13. An elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods, ε 
                                                 
12 GMM regressions of CPI inflation for India (Goyal, 2005) give a coefficient of expected inflation of 
0.67.  India’s share of imports in GDP was about 20 percent in 2005, and the proportion of population 
in rural areas 60 percent. In GMM regressions of aggregate demand with monthly data, the one period 
forward index of industrial production was strongly significant with a coefficient of –0.42.   
13 The Hall and Jones (1999) index of social infrastructure gives 63 as the emerging market average 
compared to 14 as the developed country average, implying a δ of about a quarter. Since there has been  12
equal to 6, implies a steady-state mark-up, μ, of 1.2. The value of ν- μ derived from 
the value of α, δ and ĸ is -0.9675. The price setting parameters are such that prices 
adjust in an average of one year (θ = 0.75), giving λ = 0.24. 
 
Since σR = 1 and 1/σP=0, the implied average intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
is η(1-α) + α=0.58. A negative interest rate effect on consumption requires an 
intertemporal elasticity large enough so that the substitution effect is higher than the 
positive income effect of higher interest rates on net savers. Empirical studies have 
found real interest rates to have weak effects on consumption. Especially in low-
income countries subsistence considerations are stronger than intertemporal factors. 
This is particularly so when the share of food in total expenditure is large. The 
elasticity Ogaki, Ostry and Reinhart (1996) estimate in a large cross-country study, 
varies from 0.05 for Uganda and Ethiopia to a high of 0.6 for Venezuela and 
Singapore.  Our average elasticity compares well with these figures.  
 
Burns (2008) estimates that the level of technology employed in developing countries 
is only one-fourth that in high income countries but technological progress increased 
40-60 percent faster in the former than in the latter between the early 1990s and early 
2000s. At is normalized at unity for the SOE. Since catch-up has been even faster in 
India in recent years we take its value to be 0.8 in the SOEME.   
 
These calibrations allow the calculation of the three natural rates and the contribution 
of each of the exogenous components to the natural rates. Table 1 shows these and 
also the coefficient values of each exogenous term. For the SOEME natural output is 
lower than world output while the natural terms of trade are higher. It shows the 
component values are dominated by cP. The distortions in a SOEME subsumed in the 
constant terms are also important. The coefficient value of the gap from world income 
levels is highest for natural output.  
 
 




at = -0.2231 = 







y   -0.4901 -0.1413  0  0.3773  0.0873 -0.1667  85 . 0 = Y
 
s   -0.8450 -0.1413  0  1.3373  -0.0127  0.3384  4 . 1 = S  
rr   0.01 0.0024  0  -0.0319    -0.0185  -0.0185 
Coefficient values 
y   -0.2313 0.6332  -0.1572 -0.2358  0.8734    
s   -.3989 0.6332  -0.5572  -0.8358  -0.1266     
rr   0.01 -0.0109  -0.00039  0.0193       
 
 
These results are intuitive since low wages and productivity require a depreciated 
terms of trade for output to be competitive in world markets. The gap signifies the 
                                                                                                                                            
extensive building of infrastructure and convergence in infrastructure over the past decade we take a 
value of 0.5.  13
potential catch-up raising natural output. Subsistence consumption and the gap from 
world income levels, tend to raise natural output while technology and infrastructure 
backwardness reduce it. Over the longer-run policy has to take account of the changes 
in natural rates. For example, as catch-up occurs, improvements in technology and 
infrastructure will raise natural output while a rise in subsistence consumption levels 
or a closing of the potential gap would lower it.  
 
Policy makers have to be careful that they are using the correct natural output in their 
output gap variable so that they accommodate rather than choke changes in natural 
output. Permanent shocks affect natural output and terms of trade but not natural 
interest rates, since the change in natural output is permanent. Policy makers may 
raise interest rates with output if they do not realize that natural output has also risen 
so that the output gap is unchanged. Although lower rates help absorb labour in 
productive sectors, higher risk premiums in the SOEME may keep policy rates high.  
 
Short-run policy has to respond to temporary shocks. Table 1 shows shocks to 
subsistence consumption have the largest size among shocks affecting the natural 
interest rate and tend to reduce it. We take the exogenous force driving the dynamic 
impulse response as a calibrated 0.1 shock to the period one natural rate. The latter 
equals ρ = β
-1-1. The policy response is obtained under discretion with a central bank 
minimizing different weighted averages of inflation (domestic or consumer), output 
and interest rate deviations from equilibrium values normalized at unity for the 
simulations (
2 2 2 i q q y q L i Y + + = π π ). The weights attached to the different 
arguments of the loss function (qs) ensure stability since the weight on inflation 
exceeds unity. Under strict inflation targeting only inflation has a positive weight of 2. 
The exchange rate directly affects consumer inflation while it affects domestic 
inflation through its affect on marginal cost. Monetary policy affects domestic 
inflation directly by changing the output gap. Domestic inflation is a component of 
consumer inflation. 
 
Table 2 reports some of the simulations. The benchmark set of parameters, for which 
sensitivity analysis is undertaken, is indicated. The unconditional standard deviations 
are reported. The square gives a measure of the welfare loss.  
 
The effect of monetary policy depends on the lag structure imposed. Since there are 
many administered prices in the Indian consumption basket we assume: 
( ) t H t t t H t t H t H t H t t t e e P P P P , 1 1 , 1 , , , 1 ; ; π α π π π π − − + = − = − = − − − −  
That is, consumer price inflation is a weighted average of lagged domestic prices and 
current depreciation. This structure seems to capture aspects of the relationship 
between Indian domestic and consumer price inflation, where the latter changes with 
a lag but is becoming more affected by current import prices as the economy opens 
out. Domestic inflation tends to lead consumer price inflation although the latter is 
normally more volatile. 
 
A large number of simulations were done, with different variations of the model, to 
establish robustness. This enabled crosschecking to remove errors. The policy 
response is on expected lines. There is stability or convergence back to the initial state 
by the 12
th period. The volatilities and initial simulated variable values (in brackets) in 
selected simulations are reported in Table 2. The first row reports results of Goyal  14
(2007) in which comparison of different types of discretionary targeting, under a cost 
shock impacting domestic inflation, showed that domestic inflation targeting (DIT) 
delivered the lowest volatility and therefore highest welfare. This result continues to 
hold under a generic shock to the natural interest rate, since DIT delivers lower 
inflation and exchange rate volatility with only slightly higher interest rate volatility. 
The initial rise in the policy rate is higher than with CPI inflation targeting (CIT) so 
that the rise in income is lower, but still volatility is higher with CIT. DIT also 
performs better than CIT under more kinds of exchange rate management. Therefore 
the DIT is used as the benchmark again. The reason for higher volatility with CIT is 
excessive use of the exchange rate channel, combined with lags in the CPI (Table 2 
and Figures1 and 3). 
 
The generic response to a rise in the natural interest rate is a rise in the policy rate. 
But because initially the gap between the policy and the natural interest rate falls, 
output rises, this raises domestic inflation, but the accompanying currency 
appreciation reduces consumer price inflation. The rise in the policy rate covers the 
expected future depreciation and slowly brings output back to steady-state levels 
(Figure 1). The response to a fall in natural rates to –0.01 (Figure 4 for DIT) is 
absolutely symmetric, with the signs reversed. Policy rates fall now. CIT has a lower 
increase in policy rates but greater volatility in every other variable.  
 
Considering the cases of exchange rate management, only the exchange and inflation 
rates change under DIT. With S fixed the only change from the benchmark is a lower 
appreciation and therefore lower fall in consumer price inflation (Figure 3). With E 
fixed there would be a slight rise in these prices for a positive shock (Figure 4). They 
fall with a negative shock. The large response in the policy rate under CIT limits the 
rise in output, without much gain in further inflation reduction (Figure 1). CIT 
targeting delivers a much lower rise in policy rates under perfectly flexible exchange 
rates but a much higher rise under fixed exchange rates, compared to DIT, so that DIT 
is more robust. CIT does almost as well only in the case of fixed terms of trade, since 
the exchange rate channel contributes to stabilizing inflation but excessive volatility is 
avoided. Under fixed exchange rates the exchange rate channel is not available at all 
leading to large policy rate response and more volatility.            
 
    Table 2: Simulations and volatilities 













qy=0.7, qπH=2,qi=1  0.58 0.36 1.08  0.82  0.70(0.0256) 
DIT, 0.01rn qy=0.7,  qπH=2,qi=1  0.46(-0.02)     0.16(0.006)  0.31  1.59          
(-0.054) 
0.39 (0.0133) 
DIT, 0.01rn S  Fix  0.31(-.0036)  0.16 0.31  1.02  0.39(0.0133) 
DIT, 0.01rn  E Fix  0.21(0.0068)    0.16 0.31  0.00  0.39  (0.0133) 
CIT, 0.01rn qy=0.7,  qπ = 2, 
qi=1 
0.45(-0.004)  0.43(0.0161)  0.59  1.85          
(-.0585) 
0.38 (0.0063) 
CIT, .01rn S  Fix  0.33  0.05(0.0006)  0.22 1.05 0.54  (0.02) 
CIT, .01rn  E  Fix  0.54 0.30 0.77  0.00  0.84(0.0296) 
DIT, .01rn   S sticky model, S 
fix 
0.12                 0.32  0.10  0.38  0.11(0.0039) 
CIT, .01rn  S sticky model,   0.10                 0.32  0.09  0.40  0.08(0.0001) 
CIT, .01rn  S sticky model, S 
fix 
0.12                 0.33  0.11  0.39  0.12(0.0041) 
Note: The bracketed terms give the value of the variable in the first period of the simulation  15
  
In the simulations above, market expectations are that the terms of trade will adjust to 
their natural level. If the policy commitment to fixed or managed rates is credible, 
factoring in fixed terms of trade changes the coefficients of the equations. Simulations 
were also conducted with this S sticky model. Notable is the much lower rise in the 
policy rate, much higher output response, and lower inflation and exchange rate 
volatility. The supply curve is much flatter, supporting the theoretical result of a 
flatter supply curve with S fixed (Figure 5, 6, and Table 2). In the S sticky model with 
S fixed both DIT and CIT have very similar effects. Table 2 gives results for CIT with 
S fixed and flexible respectively although the latter is not consistent with a credible 
belief in fixed terms of trade. CIT does best if the terms of trade are credibly fixed. 
Although in general the performance of CIT improves with S fixed, its highly variable 
performance, suggests that DIT is more robust. 
Table 3: Reaction Functions 
Simulations Parameters  Coefficients  of: 






Interest rate  
DIT, .01rn qy=0.7,  qπH=2,qi=1 0.0133  0.1282    -0.0659 
DIT, -0.01rn  E Fix  -0.0133               0.1282    -0.0659 
CIT, 0.01rn qy=0.7,  qπ = 2, qi=1  0.0063   0.2310  - 0.0710  -0.0345 
CIT, -0.01 rn  qy=0.7, qπ = 2, qi=1  -0.0063   0.2310  - 0.0710  -0.0345 
CIT, .01rn S  Fix  0.0200  0.0397  0.0728  -0.1036 
CIT, .01rn  E Fix  0.0296          0.0192  0.0470  -0.0795 
DIT, .01rn   S sticky model, S fix  0.0039     0.0254    -0.0206 
CIT, .01rn  S sticky model,   0.0001      0.2837  -0.1266  -0.0137 
CIT, .01rn  S sticky model, S fix  0.0041        0.0005  0.0086  -0.0207 
Table 3 gives the reaction functions in the different cases. Noteworthy is the fall in the 
weight on the output gap in the S sticky model, again demonstrating the flatter supply 
curve. There is a weight on the exchange rate under CIT since CPI is a weighted 
average of the exchange rate and domestic inflation. Under S fix, when the change in 
exchange rate is moderated, the sign becomes negative while it is positive with 
flexible exchange rates. 
 
The simulation results should be taken as only indicative since the model is not 
estimated, and is idealized in many respects. To give inputs for actual policy the lag 
structures specific to an economy have be built in. Even so, the structural SOEME 
features together with the microfoundations give useful insights for policy.  
 
6. Indian Episodes 
India has largely followed a monetary targeting approach. In the late nineties there 
was a switch to a multiple indicator approach. There is no formal inflation targeting 
but the policy statements give both inflation control and facilitating growth as key 
objectives. A specific value of 5 percent is given as the desirable rate of inflation, 
with the aim to bring it even lower in the long-term. Although the exchange rate was 
said to be market determined after the reforms and two-stage devaluation of the early 
nineties, massive RBI intervention continued in order to absorb foreign inflows. 
Trend depreciation was allowed all through the nineties in order to cover the inflation 
differential and maintain the real effective exchange rate set in the early nineties. 
There was some appreciation due to the weakening of the dollar from 2002, and two-
way movement of the nominal exchange rate was allowed from 2004. Foreign 
exchange reserves had been accumulating steadily since the opening out, but 
accelerated in this period. Inflation fell in the late nineties and continued low despite  16
high growth and firming international oil prices, but it peaked in March 2007 and 
2008. Throughout this period, gradual financial reforms deepened markets; most 
interest rates stopped being administered, and became an effective policy 
instrument
14. With the implementation of the liquidity adjustment facility (LAF) in 
2001 policy was successful in keeping call money rates between the LAF bands 
determined by the policy repo and reverse repo rates, which began to be changed 
frequently and smoothly.  
 
The economy has suffered from frequent cost shocks, either from a failure of the rains 
or from international oil price shocks.  Since there are administered interventions in 
the price of food and of oil, their point of impact on prices is known. Administered 
prices are normally raised after monetary interventions to bring down inflation rates 
(Bhattacharya and Bhattacharyya, 2001). Political sensitivity to the consumption of 
the poor, (in a democracy where they are still about 30 percent of the population, and 
50 percent of average consumption basket is spent on food) has normally implied 
monetary accommodation of government expenditure during a drought, with a 
tightening immediately afterwards (Dash and Goyal, 2000). 
 
Our optimal monetary policy model does imply that policy should accommodate a 
temporary shock to the consumption of the poor, but instead of relying solely 
subsequent monetary tightening to bring down inflation, more nuanced policies that 
shift down the supply curve could be followed. Because of greater interest and 
exchange rate flexibility more policy options have now become feasible. We illustrate 
past policy responses and the variants suggested by our model below.   
 
The drought and terms of trade shocks over 1965-67, led to a fiscal tightening, with a 
cut in budget deficits and public investment. Monetary policy was non-
accommodating but not severe. Fiscal and monetary policies were closely linked, as 
the budget deficit was automatically financed. The oil price plus agricultural supply 
shock over 1973-75 led to severe monetary and fiscal measures. In both cases there 
was an unnecessary loss of output. A focus on expanding food supply would have 
been more effective (Joshi and Little, 1994). The lesson had been learned by the 
1979-80 crisis. There was no cut in public investment, no sudden monetary 
tightening, no long-term adverse effects on output, and a rapid recovery. 
 
But the populist fiscal response to supply shocks was having a cumulative effect in 
widening the revenue deficit. The response to the early nineties balance of payments 
crisis included a cut in public investment, an artificial agricultural supply shock as 
procurement prices for food grains were raised, and a monetary tightening to sterilize 
capital inflows in 1992-93. Growth revived in 1993-94, and monetary policy was 
accommodating, but exchange rate volatility in 1995 led to a monetary squeeze that 
precipitated a slowdown. The monetary stance was relaxed, but reversed again at the 
first sign of exchange rate volatility. Inflation fell, with the improvements in 
productivity, and the influence of low global inflation in a more open economy, but 
industrial growth did not revive until 2003, when Indian interest rates followed falling 
global interest rates.  And even with higher growth, inflation remained low despite an 
extended period of high global oil prices.  
                                                 
14 Agarwal (2008) establishes this empirically by examining monetary transmission in different post 
reform periods.  17
 
Macroeconomic policy was vitiated by the fiscal authority's populism and the 
monetary authority's tendency to squeeze demand, until it was rescued by falling 
global interest rates. The fiscal responsibility and budget management act (FRBM) 
enacted in 2003 was not designed to protect investment while controlling populism 
and inefficiency, so the fiscal authority continued excessive populism while being 
conservative with productive expenditure. Off balance sheet items like oil bonds 
destroyed the spirit of the act while satisfying the letter. The Reserve Bank had more 
autonomy, since it no longer had to automatically finance deficits; fiscal populism 
pushed it towards conservatism in order to reduce inflationary expectations. But since 
populism raised inefficiencies and therefore costs the supply curve shifted up, while 
monetary tightening reduced demand, resulting in a large negative effect on output for 
little gain in lower inflation. 
 
Monetary policy can use its knowledge of structure to fight inflation. Policy has to 
tighten only if there is excess demand. But supply shocks have been the dominant 
source of inflation. During a catch-up period of rapid productivity growth, potential 
output becomes more uncertain. Excess demand can be removed without output cost 
if agents are forward looking, but a cost shock creates a short-run tradeoff between 
inflation and output variability. 
 
Since food inflation has high welfare costs, where food is still a large part of the 
consumption basket, this can be countered in the short-term by exchange rate policy, 
changes in tax rates, or other fiscal measures. Rise in wages in response to food prices 
has been important in second round propagation of Indian inflation. Inflation targeting 
would prevent the second-round inflationary wage-price expectations from setting in 
that can imply a permanent upward shift in the supply curve from a temporary supply 
shock. Optimal policy can aim to achieve a stricter inflation target only over the 
medium-term in order to allow time for temporary supply shocks to peter out. Short-
term inflation targeting should be flexible.  
  
If two-way movement of the nominal exchange rate is synchronized with temporary 
supply shocks, and the exchange rate appreciates when there is a negative supply 
shock, it would lower intermediate goods and food prices. This differs from fixing the 
exchange rate to bring down high levels of inflation, which often leads to real 
appreciation and ends in a crisis, as in Latin American exchange-based stabilization 
episodes. Two-way movement only pre-empts the effect of temporary supply shocks 
on the domestic price-wage process. 
 
The nominal exchange rate reacts to temporary shocks, and the terms of trade to 
permanent. Productivity improvements would be required to tackle shocks like a 
permanent rise in global oil prices. In our model, the natural terms of trade must 
appreciate with a rise in the consumption of the poor. Unless it is productivity driven, 
such an appreciation would come through inflation. Equilibrium appreciation of 
natural rates gives policy more freedom to change nominal rates.  
 
7. Conclusion 
The optimizing model of a SOEME, with dualistic labour markets and two types of 
consumers, delivers a tractable model for monetary policy. The basic structure of the 
forward-looking aggregate demand and supply equations is the same as for the SOE  18
and the closed economy, but the parameters depend on features of the labour market 
and on consumption inequality. These parameters also affect the natural rates. The 
SOEME collapses to the SOE model as inequality disappears.  
 
Although the slope of the aggregate supply curve is lower in an open compared to a 
closed economy and more elastic labor supply in the SOEME curve also lowers the 
slope, the SOEME supply curve is normally steeper than the SOE curve when the 
terms of trade are endogenous. The narrow section of the population sharing 
international risk magnifies the changes in the terms of trade due to its determinants, 
which now also include subsistence consumption. 
 
The lower intertemporal elasticity of consumption also magnifies the coefficients of 
the SOEME natural terms of trade. The positive term due to subsistence consumption 
levels dominates, implying that the current terms of trade is depreciated and reduction 
of the consumption gap between the SOEME and the SOE will appreciate the natural 
terms of trade.  
 
The subsistence consumption term is the largest determinant of the natural output as 
well as the terms of trade. Policy has to be careful to accommodate permanent 
changes in natural rates taking place as development occurs and the SOEME 
approaches the SOE. It must make sure it is targeting the output gap and not output as 
natural output changes. Multiple steady-states occur on the development path.  
 
Temporary shocks affect the natural interest rate. Frequent shocks to the consumption 
of the poor tend to decrease the natural interest rate. Optimal policy requires 
insulating the output gap from such shocks, so that the CB’s interest rate instrument 
should move in step with the natural rate. Thus the CB would accommodate supply 
shocks by lowering interest rates and offset demand shocks by raising interest rates.  
 
Comparing the performance of different targeting regimes in response to a temporary 
shock to the natural rate shows that DIT delivers lower inflation and exchange rate 
volatility with only slightly higher interest rate volatility. CIT delivers a much lower 
rise in policy rates under perfectly flexible exchange rates but a much higher rise 
under fixed exchange rates so that DIT is more robust. Moreover, the volatility of all 
other variables is higher under CIT. Excessive use of the exchange rate channel under 
CIT causes higher volatility. CIT does as well only in the case of fixed terms of trade, 
since the exchange rate channel contributes to stabilizing inflation but excessive 
volatility is avoided. Under fixed exchange rates the exchange rate channel is not 
available at all leading to large policy rate response and more volatility. 
 
If the policy commitment to fixed or managed rates is credible, factoring in fixed 
terms of trade changes the coefficients of the equations. Notable in this S sticky 
model is the much lower rise in the policy rate, much higher output response, lower 
change in inflation, and in the exchange rate. That is, the supply curve is much flatter, 
supporting the theoretical result of a flatter supply curve when S is not endogenous.  
 
Goyal (2007) had established that monetary policy does best, in the presence of cost 
shocks, by flexible targeting of domestic inflation, giving some weight to the output 
gap and interest rate smoothing. A similar result holds here for generic shocks to the 
natural rate. Middling exchange rate regimes that imply terms of trade stay close to  19
natural rates do best, and both DIT and CIT work well in such regimes. Limited 
flexibility of the nominal exchange rate contributes to reducing inflation, but 
aggressively using the direct exchange channel at short-horizons is not optimal. 
Neither is fixing the exchange rate. 
 
Limiting capital account convertibility can help implement the required exchange rate 
policy. In particular impediments are required on short-term arbitrage so that the UIP 
does not hold. The cost of reserve accumulation will imply a higher tax on the rich but 
there are gains from the reduction in volatility. Lower inflation volatility will 
especially benefit the poor.  The terms of trade can be fixed only in the short-run, but 
over time have to accommodate changes in the natural terms of trade.  
 
The simulations give results in line with theory, but much work remains to be done. 
First, estimations and analysis for India (Goyal, 2005) suggest that CPI inflation may 
be forward-looking but domestic inflation is not. This could be expected due to the 
increasing impact of exchange rates. It will be useful, therefore to simulate the model 
imposing this restriction. Second, the implications of pricing to market or in 
importer’s currency can also be explored although this may not be so relevant for 
commodity imports. Including capital markets may imply a greater role for interest 
smoothing. Third, SOEMEs have different kinds of nominal and real wage rigidities. 
It would be particularly useful to model the consequences of real wages rigid in terms 
of food prices (Goyal, 2005), since this is a feature of populous low-per capita income 
SOEMEs, and of forward-looking wage setting. Fourth, to explore the consequences 
of relaxing simplifying assumptions, including on elasticities and on uncorrected 
steady-state distortions, such as deviations from PPP, and on asset accumulation 
through the current account. A non-zero current account implies that multiple steady 
states can exist. Fifth, derive optimal weights for the loss function specifically for a 
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Appendix A 
Deriving aggregate demand and supply in a SOE 
The generic form of the objective function the representative consumer maximizes is:  21
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 (A1) 
Consumption, C, increases and labour, N, decreases the discounted present value of 
utility with β is the discount factor. Underlying the macro variables is CES 
aggregation, over i ∈ [0, 1] countries, and j ∈ [0,1] product varieties. Aggregate 
consumption, C, is derived from CES aggregation of consumption of home and 
foreign goods ( F H C C , ). If the elasticity of substitution between H and F goods is 
equal to unity, the CES aggregation collapses to Cobb-Douglas:   
    
α α
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k  is a constant and α is an index of openness. The associated 
consumer price index (CPI) is:      
     ( ) ( )α α
t F t H t P P P ,
1
,
− =     
 (A3) 
 
CH, t is itself an index of consumption of domestic goods derived by CES aggregation 
with elasticity of substitution ε >1 over j domestic varieties. CF, t is an index of 
imported goods, derived by CES aggregation with elasticity of substitution γ =1 over 
imported goods j, from i countries of origin, Ci,t. Thus Ci,t is an index over j goods 
imported from country i and consumed domestically.  There is also CES aggregation 
with elasticity of substitution ε >1 between j varieties produced within any country i. 
 
The other great simplification in a SOE is that foreign variables are independent of 
home country action, and can be taken as given. Variables with a superscript * 
indicate foreign countries.  
 
The specific form of the utility function is: 
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 (A4) 
Since each country i is assumed to have identical preferences the subscript i can be 
dropped. The objective function is maximized subject to the period budget constraint: 
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 (A5) 
Where  t F t F t H t H t t C P C P C P , , , , + =  and Rt is the gross nominal yield on a riskless one- 
period discount bond paying one unit of domestic currency in t+1 so 
t R
1
 is its price. 
Security markets are complete. Dt+1 is the random payoff of the portfolio purchased at 
t. 
 
Differentiating with respect to the two arguments C and N and over time gives the 
intratemporal optimality condition:  22
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(A6) 
And intertemporal optimality or the consumption Euler: 
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Log- linearized forms of these FOC’s are: 
     t t t t n c p w ϕ σ + = −                (A8) 
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Where ρ, the discount rate, equals β
-1-1 and πt, CPI inflation, is given by πt=pt- pt-1. 
Small letters normally denote log variables.   
 
Optimal allocation of expenditure between domestic, H, and imported goods, F, gives: 
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Identities and relationships between different types of inflation and real exchange 
rates are also required. Log- linearization of CPI gives: 
     ( ) t F t H t p p p , , 1 α α + − =          (A12) 
The effective terms of trade is:  







, =              (A13) 
Or in log terms:   
           t H t t F p s p , , + =  
 
Substituting in CPI (Eq. A12) gives: 
      t t H t s p p α + = ,          (A14) 
Or                     t t H t s Δ + = α π π ,  
     
That is, CPI inflation is a weighted average of domestic inflation and the terms of 
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The identity 
*
, t t t F p e p + =  is used in the derivation. 
 
International risk sharing: 
The consumption Euler for any other country i, with its prices translated into home 
country prices using the nominal exchange rate, is: 
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Using the equivalent Euler equation for the home country, the definition of Q, and 
integrating over i ∈ [0, 1] countries to get 
*
t C , gives: 
                 σ ν
1
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Symmetric initial conditions and zero net foreign holdings are assumed so that υ =1. 
In the symmetric steady state with PPP, C=C* and Q=S=1 would also hold.  
 
Aggregate demand and output equality: 
For goods market clearing in the SOE, domestic output must equal domestic and 
foreign consumption ( *
H C ) of home goods:   
     
*
, , t H t H t C C Y + =     
 (A18) 
We show below that substituting the allocation FOCs (A10) and (A11) in (A18) and 
simplifying, with σ = 1, this demand supply equality reduces to: 
     t t t C S Y α =              (A19) 
 
The allocation of foreign consumption to goods produced in the SOEME is the same 
as FOC (A11) with P*t C*t instead of Pt Ct. Multiplying and dividing by P*F,t and 
converting the numerator P*F,t into SOEME prices using the nominal exchange rate 
gives: 



















α =               
  
Of the two relative prices, the first one compares the price of SOEME goods to all 
other foreign goods translated into SOEME prices. The second relative price 
compares the foreign country price index to the price index of all other foreign goods. 
Thus more SOEME goods are imported as a function of these two relative prices, the  24
weight of foreign goods in the consumption basket, and aggregate foreign 
consumption.  
 
Multiplying and dividing by Pt and substituting Qt: 






t t H C
P
P
Q C α =  
Substituting the FOC for the SOEME consumer (A10) and that just derived for the 
foreign consumer, in the aggregate demand = supply Eq. (A18) for the SOEME 
( * , , t H t H t C C Y + = ), gives: 






















t C  using risk sharing Eq. (A17): 




















t   
Simplifying and assuming σ =1 gives:     












t   
     σ α
1
1−
= Q C S C t t  
Which simplifies to (A19) 
   
 
Determinants of the terms of trade: 
Substituting risk sharing again (with σ = 1) in aggregate demand equals supply Eq. 
(A19),  we  get:        
       Q C S Y t t





t t S Q  
              Y t 
α α − =
1 *
t t t S Y S      
         




t =                                                         
(A21) 
That is, the terms of trade depreciate with a rise in home output relative to world 
output. 
 
Deriving aggregate supply: 
A simple log-linear production function where output increases with labour input and 
its productivity, gives marginal cost Eq. (A23) as a function of unit labour costs, from 
the firms’ optimization,   
      t t t n a y + =                                           
(A22) 
       25
     m c t = -ν+ wt –pH, t -at                    
(A23) 
 
The employment subsidy τ or  ( ) τ ν − − = 1 log , guarantees the optimality of the 
flexible price outcome, since it induces firms to increase employment to the social 
optimum. Adding and subtracting pt: 
     ( ) ( ) t t H t t t a p p p w mc − − + − + − = , ν  
Substituting the intratemporal FOC (A8) and CPI (A14): 
    t t t t t a s n c mc − + + + − = α ϕ σ ν          (A24) 
Substituting risk sharing (A17), production function (A22), and from 
(A21) t t t s y y − = * : 
    m c t  ( ) t t t t a s y y ϕ ϕ σ ν + − + + + = 1
*  
               ( ) ( ) t t a y ϕ ϕ σ ν + − + + − = 1                              
(A25) 
 
The log of gross mark up in steady state, mc, falls as elasticity of demand rises: 







log mc     
The difference of actual from this optimal marginal cost is:   
      mc mc mc t t − =
∧
  
Under Calvo-style staggered pricing, where (1-θ) percent of firms change prices in a 
period, the firm’s optimal price-setting can be shown to give the dynamics of 
domestic inflation as a function of real marginal cost and discounted expected future 











                            
(A26)     
The deviation of marginal cost from its optimum is related to the output gap, 
t t t y y x − ≡ , or the deviation of y from steady state  t y . The latter is derived from mct 
(A25) by imposing mct = -μ and solving for yt. If σ =1 then: 










Subtracting yt from t y , substituting for yt from the mct equation (A26) and for  t y  
from above shows how the deviation of mc from its optimal rises with the output gap: 




Combine with the price setting equation (A26) to get aggregate supply:  
 
   { } t t H t t H x E κ π β π + = +1 , ,    κ  = λ(1+φ)       (A27) 
This is the New Keynesian Phillips Curve. It differs from the standard Phillips Curve 
in including forward-looking variables, which enter since it is derived from 
microfoundations with optimization over time. Similarly for aggregate demand 
derived below.  
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Substituting c in the Euler Eq. (A9) with y from the aggregate demand equal to supply 
Eq. (A19) and log-linearizing gives: 
    {} {} () {} 1 1 1
1






Converting to domestic prices using  t t H t s Δ + = α π π , ,     
                         {} {} ) ( ρ π
σ
− − − = + + 1 , 1
1
t H t t t t t E r y E y     
Writing in terms of output gaps, 




                            
(A28) 
Aggregate demand is less interest elastic in an open compared to a closed economy, 
since α σ equals unity if σ =1 and  α σ <σ otherwise.  
                    ( )
*
1 1 + Δ + − − = t t t a t y E a r r χ ρ σ ρ α     
 (A29) 
If σ =1, χ = 0 so y
*drops out of the equation. World income then does not affect 




To derive the unemployment subsidy 
The flexible price equilibrium in the SOEME, with variables denoted by an upper bar, 
must satisfy: 




      ( B 1 )  
Where  ε is the elasticity of demand. Real optimal or steady state marginal cost 
defined above must also equal real unit wage costs:  ( )
t H t P
W
A ,
1 δ τ −
− . The subsidy τ 
decreases unit labour cost and costs imposed by poor infrastructure increases it. If 
world infrastructure quality is unity then δ <1 measures poor infrastructure in the 
SOME which adds to the marginal cost facing a firm. 
 
The first order condition from the consumer’s choice, the definition of the terms of 
trade and the aggregate demand equal to supply identity in the SOEME give: 
( )
[] t t C
t t N






− =        












     
  
f r o m        K S C Y t t
α
=       
  
 
Substituting the relations above in (B1) we get:  27
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1      ( B 2 )  
In a SOEME, which takes world output and consumption as given the optimal 










α − = − 1  






N = −  
Equating the two gives: 
() ϕ α + − = 1
1
1 N        ( B 3 )  
 








1        
Taking logarithms: 
  ( ) δ κ α μ ν log 1 log + − − = −                                             (B4) 
Where μ=log (ε/(ε-1)). The optimal marginal cost or log of the gross mark-up in a 
flexible price economy is - μ, so setting  ( ) τ ν − − = 1 log  such that (B4) holds gives the 
equivalent of the optimal flexible price equilibrium. 
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